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Paroline v. Unisys Corporation1
Since the 1986 decision of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,2 sexual
harassment victims have been able to use Title VII as a foundation for
their claims regardless of whether there is an economic injury.3 The
underlying policy for this action balances the need to protect those
citizens least able to protect themselves against the desire not to hold
employers strictly liable for the sexual harassment of its employees.
The Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as another act of
discrimination which Title VII prohibits." Following Meritor, lower
courts have attempted to determine exactly how far the Supreme Court
meant to extend liability in these cases.' Paroline v. Unisys Corp. is
1. 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989).
2. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
3. Id. at 65.
4. Id.
5. So far it appears that all of the federal circuits interpret Meritor in much
the same way. The following is a list of cases from each circuit dealing with the
issue of sexual harassment after Meritor.
D.C. Circuit: Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Broderick v.
Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).
First Circuit: Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (Ist Cir. 1988);
Hallquist v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union, 843 F.2d 10 (Ist Cir.
1988); Del Valle Fontanez v. Aponte, 660 F. Supp. 145 (D.P.R. 1987).
Second Circuit: Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1987);
Carrero v. New York Hous. Auth., 668 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd in
part, remanded in part, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989).
Third Circuit: Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Pa.
1988), affd, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Howard v. Pine Forge Academy, 678
F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Porta v. Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ) Inc., 654 F.
Supp. 1275 (D.N.J. 1987), affd, 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988).
Fourth Circuit is discussed infra.
Fifth Circuit: Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596
(W.D. Tex. 1988); Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Tex.
1987).
Sixth Circuit: Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987); Rabidue
v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986); Shrout v. Black Clawson Co.,
689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Jackson-Colley v. Army Corps of Eng'rs., 655
1
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another step in this process. Paroline extends the liability of employers
for failing to prevent sexual harassment from occurring in certain
situations, but not to the degree of holding employers strictly liable.
0
Previously, employers were required only to take prompt and adequate
remedial measures after the sexual harassment occurred. 7
In Paroline, Elizabeth M. Paroline sued her former employer,
Unisys Corporation (Unisys), and a current employee of Unisys, Edgar
L. Moore, for sexual harassment.8 Paroline asserted claims of sexual
harassment and constructive discharge under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.9
I. FACTS OF PAROLINE
The events that spawned this action began in the fall of 1986 when
Paroline applied for a job as a word processor for Unisys.' ° During her
interview, Moore asked Paroline how she would respond to sexual
harassment." After Paroline was hired, Moore began making sexually
suggestive remarks to Paroline which she found offensive.' 2 On one
F. Supp. 122 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
Seventh Circuit: Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988); Scott v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986); Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff
Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Eighth Circuit: Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc. 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
Ninth Circuit: Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 786 (1989); Froyd v. Cook, 681 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
Tenth Circuit: Sahs v. Amarillo Equity Investors, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 256
(D. Colo. 1988); Haehn v. City of Hoisington, 702 F. Supp. 1526 (D. Kan. 1988).
Eleventh Circuit: Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, reh'g
denied, 874 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1989); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc.,
845 F.2d 900 (11th Cir. 1988); Silversteinv. Metoplex Communications, Inc., 678
F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
6. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107.
7. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988); Swentek
v. USAir Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630,
636 (6th Cir. 1987);.
8. Paroline, 879 at 103.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). She also asserted pendent state law
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against both defendants.
In addition, she brought a claim for assault and battery against Moore and a
claim for negligent failure to warn and reckless endangerment against Unisys.
Paroline, 879 F.2d at 102.
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occasion Moore rubbed his hands on her back while she was working,
even though she indicated that she wished he would stop."
On January 22, 1987, due to a severe snowstorm, Paroline was
forced to accept a ride home from Moore. 14 During the trip he made
sexually suggestive remarks, kissed her, and persistently tried to hold
her hand.15 Moore insisted on entering her apartment (despite her
objections). 16  Inside the apartment, Moore grabbed and kissed
Paroline against her will.17 She eventually convinced him to leave.'
8
The following day Paroline reported the event to Peterson, the
supervisor of that Unisys office.' 9 According to Paroline, Peterson
indicated that he was aware of other complaints of sexual harassment
involving Moore.20 After an investigation, Unisys revoked Moore's
security clearance2' and warned him that if there were any more
incidents, the office would terminate his employment. 22  Because
Paroline had not received her security clearance yet, she feared the
revocation of Moore's clearance would put her into more frequent contact
with him.23 If his security clearance was revoked before Unisys
cleared Paroline, they both would be restricted to a limited area where
nonsecurity-cleared personnel worked. Although she was asked to stay,
Paroline quit on February 15, 1987.2 She filed this action in the








20. Id. Paroline claimed that when her harassment by Moore was reported
to Peterson he replied, "Oh no, not again." Id. at 108.
21. Id at 103. Unisys had a Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facility
which required a special security clearance for entrance. New employees must
receive clearance through the Government Defense Investigative Service. The
amount of time required for investigation is unclear but was implied to be more
than two weeks. Id. at 109.
22. Id at 103.
23. Id. at 104.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 103-04.
1990] 805
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Paroline argued under the Civil Rights Act of 196426 that Moore
was her employer in the sense that he was an agent of Unisys.2 1 She
claimed he had sufficient supervisory capacity over her in that he was
involved in her interview and recommendation for hire and personally
gave her work assignments on at least one occasion.28 Conversely,
Unisys suggested that Moore "had no authority regarding her hiring,
performance reviews, promotions or decisions related to discipline or
termination.",
29
Paroline's sexual harassment claim stated that the harassment
created a hostile work environment under Title VII.' To succeed in
this claim she needed to prove that the harassment interfered with her
ability to work and her psychological well-being and that it would do so
to a reasonable person in her position."' In other words, the conduct
must be significantly severe and pervasive to accomplish this resultY.8
Unisys argued that Paroline failed to produce evidence of the severity
or pervasiveness of the claim and there was no basis for holding Unisys
liable for Moore's conduct.' Paroline advanced two theories imputing
liability to Unisys. First, she argued that Unisys took inadequate
remedial action after she lodged her complaint.' Second, she ad-
vanced the theory that Unisys had a duty to prevent her harassment
because the corporation knew Moore previously had sexually harassed
other females in the office.
a5
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on both the issue whether Moore was an "employer" under
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). The definition of employer includes "a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees ... and any agent of such person." Id
27. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104. There was no disagreement as to whether
Unisys fell within the statutory definition of employer.
28. Id-
29. Id
30. Id at 104-05. Section 2000e-2(a)(1) of Title VII provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
other wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
31. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 105.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 105.
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Title VII and on the issue of sexual harassment.3 The court held that
Unisys and Moore could not be held liable because Unisys took prompt
remedial action and Paroline quit before the remedial measures Unisys
activated had a chance to become effective.'
The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment in favor of the
defendants by stating there were genuine issues of fact involved and a
fact finder could reasonably conclude in favor of Paroline. In reversing
the summary judgment on the sexual harassment claim, the court of
appeals recognized both of Paroline's theories.8 When an employer,
who anticipates or reasonably should anticipate that the plaintiff will
become a victim of sexual harassment, fails to take action to reasonably
prevent the harassment in a hostile environment claim under Title VII,
a court will allow a plaintiff to state a claim against the employer for
failing to prevent the sexual harassment regardless of whether any
remedial action was taken.
39
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
While some circuits already were beginning to recognize that sexual
harassment violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Supreme
Court in Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson,4° ratified these decisions and
gave precedent to those circuits which had not yet recognized this cause
of action. The Meritor court stated that "[n]othing in Title VII suggests
that a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment
should not be likewise prohibited. "41 Before the Mentor decision, the
Eastern District of Missouri was headed in this direction with Harrison
v. Reed Rubber Co.42 The court stated that sexual harassment could
amount to discrimination but it did not recognize that sexual harass-
ment alone was enough to violate Title VII.43 In Moylan v. Maries
36. Id The district court also granted summary judgment against
Paroline's claims of reckless endangerment, constructive discharge and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id at 113.
37. Id. at 102. Unisys notified Paroline on January 29, 1987 of the
measures taken against Moore. Unisys then offered her two weeks leave.
Paroline quit on February 15, 1987. Id. at 104.
38. Id. at 106.
39. Id.
40. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th
Cir. 1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
41. 477 U.S. at 66.
42. 603 F. Supp. 1457 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
43. Id. at 1461.
19901
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County,4 for the first time the Eighth Circuit considered whether a
claim of sexual harassment stated a cause of action under Title VII
45
The court held that a sexually hostile work environment did indeed
constitute a violation of the Act.46 Since the Meritor decision, the
Eighth Circuit has not hesitated to apply this cause of action. In
Minteer v. Auger,47 a female prison guard brought a claim of sexual
harassment. The court applied the standards of Meritor and found the
harassing conduct did not rise to the level of severity required and the
defendants responded adequately to her complaints. Even though they
found against the plaintiff, they followed the precedent established by
Meritor.' In the later case of Jones v. Wesco Investments, Inc.41 the
court found the plaintiff had met the level of severity required to
establish a sexually hostile work environment.'
According to Meritor, employers are liable for their own sexual
harassment of employees.5' Also, employers are held liable for a co-
worker's sexual harassment if the employer has "actual or constructive"
knowledge of the hostile environment and does not take action. 52 This
action must be "reasonably calculated to end the harassment."5 3 In
Paroline, the previous incidents of harassment gave Unisys knowledge
of this kind.
One of the disputed elements of a Title VIIt claim is whether the
defendant is an "employer" within the meaning of the act. 5 5 To hold
Moore liable along with Unisys and to help impute knowledge to Unisys,
Paroline had to prove Moore was an "employer." "Employer" is defined
as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen
44. 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986).
45. Id. at 749.
46. Id- at 750.
47. 844 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988).
48. Id. at 570-71.
49. 846 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1988).
50. Id. at 1156; see also Staton v. Maries County, 868 F.2d 996,998 (8th Cir.
1989); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 1988).
51. Mertor, 477 U.S. at 66; see Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830
F.2d 1554, 1557 (4th Cir. 1987).
52. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983). The court stated that
such knowledge may be proved by showing a complaint was lodged with the
employer or "that the harassment was so pervasive that employer awareness
may be inferred." Id,
53. Id at 256.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
55. Id. § 2000e(b); cf Blesedell v. Mobil Oil Co., 708 F. Supp. 1408, 1419
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("We know of no authority... that precludes liability... when
the perpetrator is merely a fellow employee and not a supervisor.").
[Vol. 5808
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or more employees... and any agent of such a person."'' An individu-
al will qualify as an agent if he or she is "a supervisory or managerial
employee to whom employment decisions have been delegated by the
employer.n6 7 This does not mean the agent must have the power to
hire and fire personnel, as long as the agent participates in managerial
decisions.5 Clearly, the term employer is construed liberally by
including all agents, supervisors, and managers.
59
Once a party either establishes that the defendant is an employer
for Title VII purposes or can impute knowledge to an employer, the
party must show that the sexual harassment created a hostile environ-
ment.' The Supreme Court in Meritor recognized that sexual
harassment can create a hostile environment."' Sexual harassment is
defined in the Code of Federal Regulations" as "unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature."' To prove this claim, a party must
demonstrate that the conduct was unwelcome, was based on sex, was
pervasive or severe enough to create a hostile workplace, and that there
is a basis for holding the employer liable.' In proving the severity of
the conduct the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the defendant's
conduct would interfere with a reasonable person's performance and
would affect the "psychological well-being of a reasonable employee. '
The plaintiff must also in fact be affectedP6 Thus, for the most part,
it is an objective test.67
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
57. See Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986); York v.
Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982).
58. Tafoya v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097, 1104-05 (D. Colo. 1985).
59. See Duva v. Bridgeport Textron, 632 F. Supp. 880, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
("In light of the Act's remedial purpose, the term employer should be given a
liberal interpretation .... ."); see also Hall v. Gus Const. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th
Cir. 1988) (road construction company and supervisors both liable under Title
VII for harassment against female workers by crew members); Tafoya v. Adams,
612 F.2d 1097 (D. Colo. 1985) (supervisor for the City Department of Parks and
Recreation held an "employer" under Title VII).
60. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104-05.
61. Mertor, 477 U.S. at 66.
62. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1986).
63. Id-
64. Mertor, 477 U.S. at 67, 70; see also Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d
552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987).
65. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
66. Id. at 626.
67. Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Ali
employee may not be unreasonably sensitive to his working environment.")
(quoting Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981)).
1990]
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To hold an employer liable, the plaintiff must show that the
employer knew of or should have known of the harassment and failed
to take adequate remedial measures.' In Yates v. Avco Corp.0 the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the duty to correct the problem
or at least inquire arose when the initial reports of harassment by
previous employees were made, and not merely when the plaintiffs
complained. 0 The court hinted at the possibility of holding an
employer liable for failing to prevent sexual harassment when there has
been notice that an individual previously had harassed another
employee. Yates involved a supervisory employee of 28 years who had
an eight year history of harassing women.71 The plaintiffs in Yates,
though, did not predicate their claims on the employer's anticipation of
harassment; their claim rested on the lack of an adequate remedy. 2
For example, the company asked the plaintiffs not to go to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), gave the harasser an
administrative leave of absence, and told the plaintiffs to take sick leave
which resulted in a record of excessive absenteeism. The company never
re-instated the sick leave even after it found the harasser guilty and
demoted him with a drastic reduction in pay. The Yates plaintiffs used
the agency theory of Meritor to bind the company by the harasser's
actions." The court looked at the effect Mentor had on the EEOC
regulations, stating:
an employer... is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and
supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless
of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even
forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer
knew or should have known of their occurrence.7 4
Because of the previous incidents and complaints, the court held that
the company knew or should have known of the harassment of the
plaintiffs.'3 Knowledge of previous harassment, however, was merely
68. See Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261, 273 (N.D. Tex.
1987).
69. 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987).
70. Id- at 636.
71. Id
72. Id at 631.
73. Id. at 633-34. In Meritor the Supreme Court had declined to pronounce
a definitive rule on employer liability. Instead it stated that common law agency
principles should be applied. However, the Court stated that employers were
not strictly liable for the acts of their employees. Neither were employers
automatically absolved of liability due to lack of notice. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
74. Yates, 819 F.2d at 634 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1986)).
75. Id at 636.
810 [Vol. 55
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a factor in determining if the employer's remedial actions were
adequate.78 The court did not mention a necessity to prevent sexual
harassment.
III. PAROLINE'S LEGAL REASONING
In deciding whether the district court erred in granting summary
judgment, the court of appeals in Paroline first applied the facts as
alleged by Paroline to the question whether Moore was an "employer"
under Title VII."7 To be an employer, one must serve in a supervisory
position and exercise substantial control over the plaintiffs employ-
ment.7 8 Paroline's evidence showed that Moore was involved in her
interview and recommended her for hire. 9 In addition, he personally
gave her work assignments instead of delegating work through her
immediate supervisor.' The court held that whether this was suffi-
cient to make him an employer under Title VII was an issue for the fact
finder, therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate.8" A reason-
able jury could take all the inferences in favor of Paroline and find in
her favor."'
To satisfy the Mentor test, the court had to find that the conduct
was unwelcome, that it was based on sex, that it was sufficiently
pervasive to create a hostile work environment, and there was some
basis for imputing liability to Unisys.' Paroline easily met the first
two requirements, at least for purposes of summary judgment.
The court addressed the severity or pervasiveness of the harass-
ment.84 Paroline needed to present evidence that her ability to work
or her psychological well-being was affected by the harassment.
Paroline stated that she feared coming to work because of Moore and
that he had adversely affected her ability to concentrate.85 Others
stated in depositions which Paroline had prepared that she "appeared
upset, even visibly shaken, by Moore's conduct."8" In addition, she was
prepared to present the testimony of her psychologist who concluded
76. Id-
77. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 103.
78. Id at 104; see also York, 684 F.2d at 362.




83. Id- at 105; see also Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557.
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Moore caused Paroline to suffer a "depressive neurosis.8 7 Based upon
this evidence, the court held that a reasonable fact finder could conclude
that Paroline's well-being and work performance were adversely
affected. This evidence could be used to prove that a reasonable
person in Paroline's position would be reasonably affected. Paroline
knew of Moore's past record, had suffered the attack at her apartment
in spite of Unisys' orders that he desist from the harassment, and she
held a lower rank in the company." By showing she was affected and
that a reasonable person in her position would be affected, Paroline
presented sufficient evidence to overcome a summary judgment
motion.8 9 The court of appeals ruled that it was error to hold that as
a matter of law Paroline had not shown sufficiently severe or pervasive
harassment.'
Furthermore, the court held that under either theory of liability,"
Paroline presented adequate evidence to survive the motion for
summary judgment.92 Paroline's first theory was that after her
complaint, Unisys did not take adequate remedial action.93 It is not
controverted that her complaint gave notice to the company of the
harassment by Moore. 4 The reprimands previously given to Moore
had failed to deter him from harassing Paroline, therefore she had a
valid argument that the present remedy would have no effect." In
addition, she presented evidence that the revocation of Moore's security
clearance increased her chances of encountering him in the office. 0
Paroline also introduced evidence that the head of the Unisys office and
the male employees at Unisys openly joked about the harassment of the
female employees.9" The court stated this sent a message to the male
employees that the company was not serious in its efforts to stop the
harassment.98 Taking all inferences in favor of Paroline, the court
concluded that "summary judgment was inappropriate because a fact
87. Id.
88. Id- at 105-06.
89. Id at 106.
90. I&
91. Paroline argued: (1) Unisys did not take adequate remedial action and
(2) Unisys had a duty to prevent her harassment. Id.
92. Id
93. Id.
94. Id. Unisys argued that it did indeed take prompt and adequate action
when it received the notice. Id.
95. Id. at 106-07.
96. Id
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finder could reasonably conclude that Unisys' remedy was inadequate
under the circumstances. "
9 9
The court adopted the logic of Katz v. Dole,°" to hold an employer
liable for not preventing sexual harassment.' 0' In Katz, the court
stated that the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of harass-
ment and show that the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment, yet failed to take "effectual action to correct the situa-
tion.'01 2 Furthermore, the Katz court stated that to avoid liability, an
employer with knowledge of harassment must do more than just
implement or point to an existing policy against sexual harassment.'0 3
The Katz decision did not state what more was required of an employer
to avoid liability. The Paroline court added the Katz duty to do more
than just implement a procedure to deal with sexual harassment
complaints with the concept in Yates of when this duty arises.10
4
Under this combined reasoning, the Fourth Circuit imputed liability for
failing to prevent the harassment.10 5 The court took the reasoning
behind constructive knowledge and went a step further stating that
knowledge of previous harassment can be used in deciding the em-
ployer's liability.'0o The Fourth Circuit broadened the employer's
liability and held that knowledge of previous harassment could create
a duty on the part of the employer to prevent any foreseeable sexual
harassment.10 7 The court did set out some guidelines in Paroline.
The victim must be foreseeable, the harasser must have harassed others
before this victim, and the employer must have had knowledge of the
prior harassment.
99. Id-
100. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
101. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107.
102. Katz, 709 F.2d at 256.
103. Id.
104. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107. The Yates court stated that a duty to
inquire arises when an employer receives the initial reports of harassment.
Yates, 819 F.2d at 636.
105. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107. "In a hostile environment case under Title
VII, we will impute liability to an employer who anticipated or reasonably
should have anticipated that the plaintiff would become a victim of sexual
harassment in the workplace and yet failed to take action reasonably calculated
to prevent such harassment." I&.
106. Both Katz and Yates use the language "know or should have known"
when discussing employer's knowledge of harassment. See Yates v. Avco Corp.,
819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir.
1983).
107. Katz, 709 F.2d at 256.
1990]
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IV. FUTuRE APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF PAROLINE
The Paroline holding does not directly contradict any previous
holding concerning sexual harassment. The court in Yates seemed to be
heading in this direction when it discussed the relevance of previous
incidents of harassment involving women other than the plaintiff and
the relevance of the employer's knowledge of these incidents1 3 This
is consistent with Katz. The court held that an employer must show
more than mere procedures for handling harassment claims. Courts
appear to follow the plaintiffs' argument that the protection of victims
in the workplace was not adequate and that employers should do more
to remedy this situation.
109
Meritor and cases following it, however, state that employers should
not be held strictly liable for sexual harassment by their employees. 10
The Supreme Court in Meritor held that notice is not required to make
an employer liable."' Between these two broad parameters falls the
Paroline case. Its reasoning seems to be that notice is not required to
hold an employer liable for the sexual harassment of its employees, and
employers with notice are held to a higher standard. Paroline's
recognition of a claim for failure to prevent harassment does not mean
employers are strictly liable; Paroline requires some sort of knowledge
on the part of the employer. As such, it is clearly within the Mentor
parameters.
Policy considerations play a significant role in the area of sexual
harassment. Sexual harassment claims are a burden on the private
sector because of the costs of litigation and the implementation of
working policies. Set against this backdrop is the policy government
pursues in trying to protect the rights of its citizens. The policy behind
Title VII is to assure equal employment opportunities by eliminating
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or
sex." 2  It is. designed to protect those least able to protect them-
selves." 3 In holding an employer liable for failure to prevent sexual
108. Yates, 819 F.2d at 636.
109. See Swentek v. USAIR Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir. 1987); Yates
v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630,636 (6th Cir. 1987); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,255-
56 (4th Cir. 1983).
110. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
111. Id
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982); see also Garret v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 395 F. Supp. 117, 124 (W.D. Mo. 1975), affd, 531 F.2d 892 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 44 (1974)).
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harassment, the Paroline court holds that the present remedies are not
meeting this public policy. Now employers are required not only to
discourage harassment and to set up programs to facilitate victims'
claims, but also, in certain circumstances, to prevent the harassment
from occurring. This places a heavy burden on employers. Congress
showed its willingness to impose a burden on employers and place
greater importance on the rights of individuals in the workplace when
it promulgated Title VII.
Paroline is just a small step beyond the already recognized cause
of action holding an employer liable for the harassment of which he has
constructive knowledge and takes no prompt remedial action. In other
areas of law, when special relationships exist (such as property owners
and guests, product manufacturers and buyers), there is a duty to take
steps to prevent injury. Usually a warning is adequate. The Paroline
court did not state what action is necessary to prevent the harassment
or fulfill the duty of employers to employees. Whether a warning to the
employee would be adequate to prevent the harassment or fulfill the
duty is unknown. The court did state that if a male employee previous-
ly had harassed women of a certain age or category it might be
unreasonable to hold an employer liable for failing to prevent the
harassment of a plaintiff who is not in that category.1
4
The results of the Paroline decision are not entirely clear. One
result might be the termination of employees after one incident of
harassment by them to prevent any future liability. This seems to be
a harsh answer. Another alternative is to restrict a harasser's access
to members of the protected class. In many situations practical
considerations could make this impossible. Furthermore, how many
incidents of harassment must take place before an employer has
knowledge-either actual or constructive?" 5 Employers should focus
on procedures that will both prohibit and prevent harassment.
Employers cannot sit and wait for the injury but must actively seek out
the source of the harassment and take steps to eliminate it.
While Paroline does present some difficult questions, this has not
stopped courts before in allowing new causes of action. An example of
this is the willingness of the Supreme Court in 1986 to allow claims of
sexual harassment to be brought under Title VII. If the questions are
impossible to answer, however, the Supreme Court will have to look at
this cause of action and reverse. In placing such a heavy burden on
114. 879 F.2d at 107.
115. In Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261, 273 (N.D. Tex.
1987), the court apparently held that one previous incident is enough to place
the employer on notice that employees may have been sexually harassing
employees. Paroline may also make this prospective notice. See also Swentek
v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir. 1987).
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employers, the Court may have set them a Sisyphean task.' Unless
the Supreme Court reverses, employers should scrutinize their
harassment complaint procedures to find ways of preventing sexual
harassment to guard against liability.
BECKY LEAMON
116. Sisyphus was the king of Corinth who in Greek mythology was doomed
in Hades to roll a stone uphill which always rolled down again.
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